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WHAT RUSSIA DID
FOR VICTORY

I.
By Sergei Koornakoff

NEW CENTURY PUBLISHERS
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Sergei Kournakoff is one of the foremost military analysts
to emerge from World War II. Unlike many armchair and
air wave strategists, he is uniquely qualified as a writer on
military theory and practice by his entire career and background. Formerly a cavalry officer in the Imperial Russian
Army, he fought through World War I and the Russian Civil
War (on the "White" side).
Kournakoff is the author of Russia's Fighting Forces~ published by Duell, Sloan and Pearce and International Publishers, and of numerous articles on 'm ilitary matters which
have appeared in Soviet Russia Today and a number of other
magazines. He has won a wide reputation in the United States
as a writer and lecturer on military problems as they enfolded
in the crucible of the great war of liberation, and has called
the turn on major military events with almost uncanny
precision. On July 2, 1941, Sergei Kournakoff, in a speech at
Madison Square Garden, said:

UTen days ago Hitler hurled his Wehrmacht to eventual
and total destruction."
Very few people agreed with him at the time .
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... SHALL THE BALANCE. SHEET BE BALANCED?

((And the reasons for mourning in Denmark are the same
as they are in 'Ohio)
A nd the cost is not figured in krone any more than it's
measured in dollars.
~hey

are) of course) the lesser entries in the book:

The amputated leg and the artificial eye have cost somebody something:
And the broken mind cannot be repaired by a pocketful
of cash. Oh) no) no.
The quality of torture is never listed on the curb)
Nor the rate of grief computed on delicate scales..

u • ••

"

Shall the balance sheet be balanced?

By whom? How?

No combination of savants and learned cogs) holes punched
in ca~ds and electric motors)
.

.

No brow containing Euclid) not even the serenest lores '
in consultation with each other)
.
Could be else than baffled by the simplest problem of the
cost of hunger in a baby's bones."
-From ON A NOTE OF TRIUMPH
By NORMAN CORWIN

WHAT RUSSIA DID FOR
VICTORY
By SERGEI KOURNAKOFF
·O RMAN CORWIN is absolutely right. Right and discouraging. Discouraging to the one who, like myself,
N
has set himself the task to be the "learned cog" which will
attempt to compute, albeit in the most general way, the
military effort of the Soviet people and their armed forces.
The military effort of a people, especially a people who has
felt the boot of the enemy on their soil, whose cities and
villages have been transformed into little more than charred
spots on the -landscape and cherished memories on maps,
whose sons and daughters have been killed and tortured,
limbs cut off, minds set wandering-cannot be measured only
in dollars, tons, miles and days.
The mourning of the wife or mother in Ohio, tear for tear,
is the equivalent of the mourning of the wife or mother in
Smolensk. But somehow mourning is more bearable when
th~ boy's room in the family nest is intact, when other members of the family are alive and well. Mourning the dead on
a charred beam lying in melting snow in a place that was a
village-is somehow less bearable. And then there is another
thing, a thing which means little to the individual mourner,
centered in his own grief, but which is important in the life
of a nation or country: the number of mourning mothers and
wives. While "holes punched in cards" cannot measure the
grief of the individual, they can and must record the numbers.
Nothing expressed in tons,. miles, days and dollars can give
the whole picture of a country's war effort, for sobs, spasms,
pangs will be left uncounted, but the relative effort of each
5

country which took part in the anti-Hitler coalition can be
expressed only in dry figures.
Expressing this relative~ comparative effort is important.
Not for the sake of glory and self-satisfaction, but for the sake
of the soundness of the structure of peace which is being built
now. The "engineers" who are doing the building must know
the relative strength of the stones they are using for the arch
of security, lest they use limestone for a key and shove the
granite into a remote corner where it will be wasted.
The "test by steel and fire, the trial by war provides the
"engineers" with convincing data on the strength of the
material at hand, for the stubborn facts of the battlefield
cannot be faked. The dice of total war cannot be loaded.
The truth comes out in the wash for all to see. However, in
almost every country on five-sixths of the earth there are
people who do not wish to see any social changes take place
because they have a stake in the social status quo ~ people who
by the same token do not wish a new society to succeed and
who, therefore, try to obscure the vision of the people by
belittling the astounding achievements of a truly planned
society in this war. There are also those who have been
beaten and who do not wish to acknowledge that they have
been beaten to a great extent by a social system they hated
most and swore to wipe off the face of the earth. Finally,
there are those who simply want to flatter their national
ego by strutting around, beating their chests and clamoring:
"WE did it all."
The first category are the reactio.naries~ fascists~ semi-fascists
and para-fascists everywhere; the second are the Nazis; the
third are not quite as dangerous (because they are primitive
and naive)-the nationalists and chauvinists~ the "we firsters"
of many colors and flags. All these groups have one common
political denominator-anti-Sovietism~ mixed in some cases
(as in the case of some British Tories), with long standing
russophobia.
The anti-Soviet propaganda of these people has become
crystallized in half a dozen basic slogans (which are being
used with certain variations).
6

Here are these catch phrases:

The Imperial Russian Army in the First World War did
better than the Red A rmy in the Second World War. The
Tsar's soldiers retreated only to the marshes of the Polessye
while the Red soldiers were pressed back to the Volga and
the Terek. Ergo-the Imperial Army was better and the
Tsarist system was better.

•
The Red Army
its side.

WO,n.

because it had space and climate on

•

•

•

The Red Army won because the Allied Air Forces bombed
Germany into submission.

-

The Red Army won because it got its weapons through
lend-lease.

•
The Red Army won because of the traditional Hfa.talistic"
heroism of the Russian people who fought in spite of the
Soviet regime7 the communist leadership7 etc.
T he Red Army in fact did not win at all because it was
the battle of Britain which saved the world. (Another variant
is-EI Elamein was the real turning point of the war; or,
St. Lo was Germany's Waterloo.)
Every thinking person understands the hollowness of these
catch phrases, as well as their purpose (the purpose becomes
clear when one notes that every Nazi general and bigwig
who hastily fled westward in the corridor between the Oder
and the Elbe, in April 1945, uses them), but the thinking
non-military person must have the facts marshalled in order
to puncture the hollow catch phrases with the pin of logic.

7

Many 9f the facts are not known yet. Many figures are
incomplete at this time. But out of the great adding machine
of the Second World War enough figures have emerged to
see what's what.
I will try to present here the basic facts and figures pertaining to the effort of the Soviet Union in this war. For
the sake of simplicity and to aid the memory of the reader,
most data will be given in round figures. Let us add that this
pamphlet is not an effort to show that the Soviet Union won
the war alone. Most Soviet war leaders headed by Generalissimo Stalin have said that victory is a result of a common
effort. In this effort the leading United Nations chipped in
with their best. What I hope to demonstrate conclusively is
that the Soviet effort was decisive and that Soviet power~ in
all its manifestations~ played a decisive role i,n, that effort.

World War I and World War

n

Russia entered the First World War as a full-fledged military partner of France and England. In spite of certain differences between the social-political internal set-ups of England and France on one hand, and Tsarist Russia on the
other, they were bound together by common imperialistic
interests, . interests which were being threatened by German
imperialism. The latter, having embarked on an aggressive
international policy at the end of the nineteenth century,
intended to crush England and France and at least greatly
weak~n Russia by stripping her of the Ukraine, Poland, the
Baltic countries and Finland.
Community of interests brought about the formation of the
Entente. The latter was formed in stages: the Franco-Russian
alliance dated from 1891, the Franco-British alliance from
1904, and the R usso-Bri tish understanding from 1907 . Thus,
when the war broke out in 1914, Russia had been in the
so-called "western family" for seven years. Russia was not in
the least isolated, either politically or psychologically.
The international position of the Soviet Union on the eve
of World War II was diametrically opposite. The "latent war"
8

of European reaction against the U.S.S.R. had flared and
smouldered intermittently between 1917 and 194 1. In 1938
the Munich Pact, so often conveniently forgotten, had in fact
cemented a pan-European coalition against the Soviet Union,
including even the latter's ex-ally of 1935-France.'· The Soviet
Union was literally alone. She did not even have her proverbial "only friend"-Montenegro-on her side. The imperial
interests of the Anglo-French bloc and of the German bloc
united them in their hatred of the socialist state.
The First World War had smouldered for years. The sides
were lined up. There was no strategic surprise. There was
no tactical surprise, because the assassination of Archduke
Franz-Ferdinand had given all concerned more than a month's
warning. On the other hand, Hitler's attack on the Soviet
Union, coming as it did in violation of a pact of non-aggression, without the slightest warning, achieved the initial tactical surprise so essential to the success of a lightning war.
Imperial Russia met Germany in 1914 on a frontier which
had existed for generations, with a borderland fully fortified.
The Soviet border of 1941 was of recent formation and had
not been fully prepared for defense yet (although the extra
strip of fighting space, some 175 ' miles wide, in Western
Belorussia, the Western Ukraine, in the Baltic and in Bessarabia did play the salutary role of buffer. Even so, however, in
1914 the distance between the German border and Moscow,
along the central Berlin-Moscow direction, was some 900 miles,
while in 1941 it was only 650 miles.
On the flanks of the huge front, Russia's position in 1914
was incomparably more secure. In 1914, the nearest enemy
to St. Petersburg was in East Prussia, 500 miles away. In 1941
the enemy was in Finland, only 100 miles away and would
have been only 18 miles away had it not been for the preventive war against Finland, in 1939-1940.
In 1914 the nearest enemy was 250 miles from Odessa (in
Hungary). In 1941 the enemy was only 120 miles away (in
Rumania).
In 1914 Murmansk was absolutely safe (except for enemy
submarines). In 1914, thanks to "dear little" Finland and the
9

occupation of Norway by the enemy, this only Soviet outlet
to the West was under direct and severe attack.
In 1914 Japan was an ally of the Entente and Russia was
able to move practically all her troops from the Far East to
fight the Germans. This writer remembers witnessing the
arrival of Far Eastern divisions in Poland after a train trip of
ten weeks (in October, 1914). Japan supplied weapons and
munitions to Russia. In 1941 the Soviet Union was compelled
to keep a great army in the Far East because half of the Japanese army remained concentrated on the horseshoe border
of Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. Of course, this time Japan
did not give the Soviet Union as much as a rifle cartridge.
While during World War I Turkey was fighting Russia,
and while it remained outwardly neutral during World War
II, the U.S.S.R. still had to keep troops on the Turkish border
in 1941-45 because of the suspicious character of that neutrality.
The Central Powers in 1914 were considerably less strong
than Hitler's Germany was in 1941, with almost all of Europe
at her beck and call. All you have to do is compare the Germany-Austria-Hungary-Bulgaria-Turkey bloc with the Germany-Italy, Austria-Hungary-Rumania-Finland-Bulgaria-Slovakia-Croatia bloc, de facto allied with Spain, and controlling
all the rest of continental Europe with its resources, productive capacity and millions of slave labor. Furthermore, in 1914
Germany was squeezed between two fronts right from the
start, while up to June, 1944, Germany's control reached
to the Atlantic Ocean with all that implies strategically.
And this brings us to the most important difference between
Russia's strategic position in World War I and World War II.
The difference can be told in a very few words and with a
handful of figures.
During the entire World War I a Western Front existed,
and it was a "first front," not a "second front" in importance.
But during three of the four years of World War II the Soviet .
Union fought Germany and German-controlled Europe alone.
Let us look at the deployment of forces on both fronts in
1914. This initial deployment gives a measures of the situation
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which obtained throughout the whole course of that war
(with only temporary changes).
The forces deployed in the initial stage of the war were as
follows:
Central Powers

Allies
Western Front

85 Inf. Div. (Fr. & Br.)
Cav. Div. (Fr. & Br.)
52'l'2 Inf. Div. (Russian)
21 Cav. Div. (Russian)

12

Eastern Front

86 Inf. Div. (German)
10 Cav. Div. (German)
17 Inf. Div. (German)
1 Cav. Div. (German)
35 Inf. Div. (Austro.-H.)
11 Cav. Div. (Austr.-H.)

It must be noted that the fire power of an Austro-Hungarian
division was rated at about half of the power of a German
division. Thus at the outset the Russian Army faced about the
equivalent of 35 German Infantry and 12 Cavalry divisions
while the French, Belgian and British faced S6 German Infantry and 10 Cavalry divisions. This, of course, was due to
the so-called Schlieffen Plan according to which the Germans
intended to crush France first and then turn on Russia.
The greatest German concentration in the East was effected
in the campaign of 1915, but even then the Russian Army
never faced more than half of the Central Powers' effectives.
At the end of the war when Russia was practically out, the
Germans kept 20 per cent of their divisions in the East and
So per cent in the West.
Thus, barring the time when Russia was temporarily
eclipsed as a military power, the Russian Imperial Army had
to face between 30 and 50 per cent of the enemy divisions.
The Eastern Front, barring its meanderings, was roughly
1,000 miles long from the Bal tic to the Black Sea. The deepest
enemy penetration (before 1915 when the Germans occupied
the Ukraine and reached Rostov) was about 300 miles in the
center.
The Russian Imperial Army won only one campaign. That
was the Brussilov offensive in the summer of 1916. Even then,
the operation, brilliantly successful, was robbed of real
strategic results by the inept leadership of the Russian Su11

-

preme Command (nominally under the Tsar) which did not
support General Brussilov's effort. The Russian Army won
a number of tactical successes, some of them of great scope
(such as the early Galician operation), but the war as a whole
can be called a series of failures, some of them pre-eminently
heroic (such as the invasion of East Prussia to save the Allies
at the Marne). The result leaves no doubt: Russia was defeated and knocked out of the war. It must be added here
that, contrary to popular opinion, the Russia revolution was
hastened by military defeat, and not military defeat caused
by the revolution.
The Allies lost 9,300,000 killed, missing and prisoners during World War I; of these Russia lost 4,200,000 (we do not
count the wounded which were 12,800,000 and 5,000,000 respectively). Thus Russia lost less than half of what the other
Allies did. This happened because the Russian Army throughout the war faced less enemies than her A llies did.
Let us add to this that Space, Mud and Traditional Russian
Heroism were as much on the side of Russia in 1914-18 as they
were in 1941-45, with all other strategic and political factors
in her favor as compared to the U.S.S.R. And still Russia lost
World War I and the U.S.S.R. wo.n World War II.
We have compared in this chapter the initial political and
strategic factors which shaped the course of World War I as
far as Russia was concerned. We also mentioned the basic
military facts and figures pertaining to Russia in World War I.
The basic military facts concerning the U.S.S.R. in World
War II will be the theme of the next chapter because they
are too tremendous in scope to fit into a point-by-point comparison with the facts of World War I.

Highlights of the Soviet-German War
The Soviet-German War lasted 1,416 days and raged over
a theater of approximately 1,250,000 square miles.
The German-Soviet front was never shorter than the distance between the shores of the Barents Sea and the Black
Sea (except in the final stage when Finland was knocked out
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and the front stretched from the Baltic to the Black Sea) . This
distance, as the crow flies is 1,700 miles. It was the distance
between the Soviet right-flank sentry on Cape Rybachi near
Murmansk, and the leIt-flank sentry on Cape Khersonese,
near Sevastopol.
In the late summer of 1942, when the front bulged eastward
to touch Stalingrad and Grozny and the Soviet flank sentries
stood on Cape Rybachi and on the ruins of the cement factory
at Novorossisk, the front was roughly 2,700 miles long.
The line of the front did not budge in the extreme north;
it swung 650 miles in the center, from Brest-Litovsk to Voronezh; it swung 1,000 miles in the south, from Przemysl in
Galicia to Stalingrad on the Volga.
In this tremendous fighting space the Germans kept an
average of 240 divisions fighting.
A rough comparison of the "volume of fighting" in the
East and in the West would run something like this:
East-240 enemy divisions engaged during 47 months11,280 mos/div.:if:
West-70 enemy divisions engaged (France, Germany) during 11 months, plus 20 divisions (Africa, Italy) engaged
during 36 months, plus 110 enemy divisions (Low Countries,
France, 1940) engaged during lY2 months-l,655 mos/div.
Allowing for small or short-lived action like the "sitzkrieg"
in 1939-40, Poland, Norway, Greece, East Africa, etc., it can
be said that the rough ratio between the "volume of fighting"
(expressed in "division-per-month" units) done by the Western Allies and by the Soviet Union is 7:45, or about 1:6Y2).
This ratio is also borne out by the respective Allied casualties in the war against Germany. They run like this:
British Empire and U. S. killed, missing and prisoners:
1,100,000
Soviet Union, killed, missing and prisoners: .
(estimated, see chapter on

COST,

p. 31)

• Mos/div. equals one division fighting one month.
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Finally, if we compare the areas over which active land
operations were conducted, we see roughly the following:
The Red Army fought over 750,000 square miles of territory
when retreating eastward and over the same 75°,000 square
miles when advancing westward. In addition it fought over
roughly 500,000 square miles of foreign lands (between April,
1944, and May, 1945). This is a total of about 2,000,000 square
miles of fighting space.
The Anglo--American (and smaller Allied) armies in Europe and North Africa fought over an area of about 350,000
square miles (not counting the fighting of Polish troops in
1939 and the fighting of the French Army in 1940, but counting the marching and counter-marching of the British in the
Libyan coastwise corridor) .
All these calculations may seem to some rathe~ mechanical.
However, the fact that the three basic ratios-of volume of
fighting expressed in duration of fighting and the number of
enemy troops engaged, of area of figliting, and of losses incurred-all point to an over-all ratio of effort expressed in the
symbol 1 :6-shows that this ratio does express the true picture. The Soviet Union did roughly eighty-five per cent of
the fighting against Germany and her satellites.
Having established the approximate figures pertaining to
the width and length of the space within which so many Red
Army men fought and gave their lives, let us examine the
course of the war.
This course from the viewpoint of higher strategy can be
divided into four. periods: the first period lasted seven months,
between the initial German attack and the end of the Battle
of Moscow; the second lasted a year between the Battle of
Moscow and the end of the Battle of Stalingrad; the third
lasted six months between the Battle of Stalingrad and the
end of the Battle of Kursk (t~e so-called Kursk Arc); the
fourth lasted 21 months between the Battle of Kursk and
the end of the final Battle of Berlin.
Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk are three strategic turning
points of the war. Berlin is the pay-off.
14 "
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THE FIRST PERIOD
Germany attacked the Soviet Union with close to 200 divisions, of which 175 were "pure German." No other German troops were engaged anywhere except for the skirmishing
in Libya by the British against three German division~ and
a depleted Italian expeditionary force. British troops had
pulled out of Greece in May. America was still ,virtually unarmed. Britain was slowly recO'yering from the so-called
Battle of Britain. All Europe, with its 320,000,000 people
and a yearly production of 50,000,000 tons of steel, was Hitler's. The German Army could face eastward without having to look over its shoulder. World public opinion on June
21, 1941, was still babbling about "Communazism"; the Soviet Union was politically and militarily isolated.
The German High Command set itself the following strategic goal· (or objective): to destroy the Red Army within
three months and to force the U.S.S.R. to capitulate before
winter, 1941.
Territorially, the objective was: the capture of the Leningrad-Moscow-Kharkov-Rostov line, thus bringing about the
utter paraylsis of the Soviet transportation system.
The Red Army was to be destroyed west of that line, thus
making it unnecessary for the German Army to extend its
communications beyond the 60o-mile mark (Brest-LitovskMoscow).
The attainment of that goal would have also cut the Murmansk route, made the Iranian route virtually impracticable,
destroyed the Soviet Baltic Fleet, bottled up the Northern
Fleet and made the Black Sea Fleet almost useless by depriving
it of its main bases (at least, so the Germans thought).
Furthermore, the Soviet Union, deprived of 30 per cent
of her population, of half of her food producing area, 40
• The term "strategic goal," which will recur frequently in the forthcoming exposition, can be defined thus: the objective of a war, or military
campaign, set by the High Command, the attainment of which must bring
decisive results.

per cent of her coal, half of her steel and iron, was not expected by the Germans to be able to continue its resistance.
The 200-odd German divisions plunged forward in ' one
strategic echelon, blitz-fashion.
They beleaguered Leningrad, they took Kharkov, they captured Rostov (holding it for only a few days before being
ejected), they reached the outskirts of Moscow.
Vast as the enemy armies attacking Leningrad, Kharkov
and Rostov were, the direction of the main blow lay on the
Brest-Litovsk-Moscow line. Here the blitz was stopped for the
first time in September, east of Smolensk and two-thirds of
the way to the main goal (i.e., Moscow). After that it never
blitze.d again. It was a decisive delay which threw the Germans two months off schedule. Instead of opening the Battle
of Moscow in August the Germans were forced to start it in
the .beginning of October.
They concentrated fifty-one divisions, of which 13 were
armored, for the attack on Moscow. Three quarters of a million men, 1,500 tanks, 3,000 guns and 700 planes attacked a .
perimeter of 300 miles, forging a pair of pincers aimed at the
capital. In that battle the Germans had a numerical superiority of 3: 1 in tanks, 2: 1 in planes, better than 2: 1 in guns ana
1 Y2: 1 in mortars.
At the eleventh hour the Soviet High ,Command, under
Marshal Stalin, delivered a blow in the north which frustrated
the German maneuver to cut the Murmansk railroad and besiege Leningrad instead of blockading it (which is more than
a fine point), struck a blow in the south which recaptured
Rostov and, finally, struck the big blow at the central grouping of the German 51 divisions, completely r<?uting them and
throwing them back as much as 250 miles in some sectors of
the Moscow front.
Moscow, Leningrad and Rostov remained in Soviet hands, '
the Red Army was not only not destroyed, but on the offensive, Soviet industry by a "miracle" of organization had been
largely moved from the war theatre hundreds (and more)
miles to the east . . Part of the population of the occupied territory became partisans, another part was evacuated.
16

The German Army had· failed in the attainment of its
strategic goal. It had failed with its blitz-method. Between
November 16 and January 1, 1942, i.e., during the Battle of
Moscow, the Germans had lost 2,200 tanks, 14,000 motor
vehicles, 2,000 guns and 140,000 killed (which means certainly
another 400,000 wounded). Fifty of their best divisions were
shattered to the tune of 50 per cent losses.
Here are the results of the Battle of Moscow: it made the
Germans fail of the strategic goal of their decisive campaign;
it destroyed the legend of German invincibility; it inflicted
terrible human and material losses on them; it actually killed
the blitz)· it saved the Soviet Union and thus the United Nations. After the Battle of Moscow, the Germans dared no
longer thrust directly at the Soviet capital, but advanced in a
roundabout maneuver, a maneuver which, by the summer of
194 2 , brought them to Stalingrad.
At the time of the Battle of Moscow the U.S.A.A.F. was not
in action and the bombing of Europe by the R.A.F. was in
its infancy. One hundred and fifty ton raids on Hamburg
were still making headlines. The influence of such bombing
on the campaign on the Soviet Front was practically nil. As
to lend-lease, it was nothing more than a signed protocol, and
a small one at that (one billion dollars-promised, but still
undelivered) .
Russian Winter helped because the Red Army was prepared for it (through training, clothing, special oils for motors, special weapons, special methods of transport) and the
Germans were not.
Russian Space helped because it was well defended. Undefended space, passive space, does not help.
What decided the campaign was Soviet organization and
discipline, military skill, superior military direction and "traditional" Russian courage with which the people had become
imbued through education an~ their own experience and
outlook.
As far as Germany, back~d by all Europe, and the Soviet
Union are concerned, the Battle of Moscow was purely a
"man-to-man" affair, with the rest of the Allied world unable
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to do much more than cheer. However, out of those cheers
grew the great war-and-peace alliance of the Big Three. Thus,
the Battle of Moscow actually won the war and saved humanity.

THE SECOND PERIOD
As has been shown above, the first period of the Soviet-German war, culminating in the gigantic Battle of Moscow, proved
to be a German strategic, operational and tactical failure.
In view of the obvious potential superiority of the anti-Hitler coalition over Germany and her satellites, the Hitler bloc
stood before ominous perspectives. A ring of land fronts,
surrounding Germany, was the nightmare of the German High
Command, which simply had to do something and use to the
best advantage the time which was being afforded it by the
unpreparedness of the Western Allies and the lack of strategic coordination between West and East. In the spring of
1942 nothing outside the Soviet front threatened the Wehrmacht, because the front in North Africa absorbed only between 3 and 6 German divisions and half a score Italian
divisions of doubtful quality.
The Germans mustered an overwhelming majority of their
forces and again struck at the Red Army in a desperate new
attempt to crush the Red Army. The offensive, however, instead of developing between the Baltic and Black Seas as in
1941, was limited to the southern wing (roughly between Orel
and the Black Sea). Of the available 256 German divisions
the German High Command mustered 179 in the East plus
61 satellite divisions, or 240 in all. A front of 375 miles flared
up in June, 1942, but only after the Germans had been delayed about two months by the epic defense of Sevastopol and
by Marshal Timoshenko's counterblow in the Izyum-Bervenkovo sector.
Again, as in 1941, the Germans planned to advance in blitztempo: July 25-Stalingrad; August 15-Kuybyshev; September
lo-Arzamas; October-November-the attack on Moscow from
the east. Note that this time the Germans had to limit their
18

offensive to the southern one-third of the front, that they did
not dare attack Moscow head-on, but had to pursue a roundabout course and, finally, that their blitz remained on paper.
They were late at Stalingrad and never reached any of their
other objectives.
Aside from the maximum objective (capture of Moscow
from the rear), the Germans had immediate goals of limited
strategic importance: they intended to capture the entire
Donetz industrial region, the wheat of the Don and Kuban,
the oil of Maikop, Grozny and Baku. They were trying to
cut the artery of the Volga and thus deprive the U.S.S.R. of
Caucasian oil and of American materials being shipped via
Iran up the Caspian and the Volga.
Stalingrad became the strategic center of gravity of the
whole campaign, THE objective. It was also destined to become the "zenith" of the war.
The Germans threw a total of about 60 divisions into the
Don--Volga Battle. It began in the end of August and lasted
until the beginning of February.
It is not our intention to give even the most general description of this colossal battle about which vqlumes will be
written. Suffice it to say that the Germans pushed a great
spearhead to the Volga. This spearhead consisted of 22 of the
best divisions Hitler had, a total of 330,000 men. When the
Soviet double concentric pincers closed on November 24, 1942
(after five days of offensive operations), one-third of a million
enemy troops were in the bag of a "super-Cannae" from
which practically none escaped. ("Cannae" is a battle which
Hannibal won over the Romans in 216 B. C. It is consid~
ered a classic of encirclement and annihilation.) The victory
of Stalingrad was the signal for a series of Soviet offensive operations ranging from Leningrad (where the blockade was
lifted) to the Sea of Azov.
Between November 19, 1942, and March 31, 1943, the Red
Army liberated 185,000 square miles, retook a dozen of the
most important German-held key strongholds, as well as thousands of towns and villages, and piled up the following trophies:
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Destroyed

Planes
Tanks
Guns ....... . .... .
Trucks ... .. .... : ..

3,6~0

4,5 20
4,600

Captured
1,490
4,67 0
15,860
123,000

A total of 350,000 enemy soldiers were captured and 850,Counting the inevitable amount of wounded, it
may be said in the fall, winter and early spring campaigns
of 1942-1943 the Red Army destroyed single-handedly an
enemy army equivalent to the one which invaded the Lowlands and France in the summer of 1940 and conquered
Western Europe in six weeks.
While the Battle of Stalingrad was raging, Allied troops
landed in North Africa in an unprecedented armada of ships.
The operation was a masterpiece of planning and execution.
Far be it from this writer to claim that they should have
landed in France instead of Africa. Military history will pass
its verdict on this question when all the data are in. N evertheless the fact remains that the Allied landing did not
threaten the bulk of the German Army. It only put Rommel's
half dozen German divisions in a trap, forcing them to pull
out of EI Alamein and speed back to Tunisia where they were
battered into defeat, although not without a great effort.
In the fall of 1942 a pair of Axis pincers threatened the
Middle East. Paulus was moving to the Volga and Rommel
. was moving to the Nile. However, it must be borne in mind
that the arms of the pincers were very uneven: Paulus and the
second strategic echelon backing him up between the Don and
the Volga had 61 divisions, while Rommel had six Gen nan
divisions and a handful of Italian divisions.
The Allied campaign in North Africa netted about 150,000
Axis troops (including probably most of the wounded who
were captured in the Cap Bon trap). Concurrently, the campaign on the Soviet front netted 1,200,000 killed and captured
alone.
The Germans did not achieve any of their strategic objectives and met with an unprecedented military disaster. After
000 killed.
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Stalingrad the German Army never successfully went on the
offensive on a strategic scale.
As an offensive machine the Wehrmacht was through for
good. Thus, we see that Stalingrad and not EI Alemain was
the crucial battle of the war. In order to understand this just
imagine Paulus victorious at Stalingrad with Rommel beaten
at EI Alemain. The U.S.S.R. (taking the extreme view) goes
under and the Wehrmacht turns west in the Spring. What
value would have attached to the Tunisian victory if ~llied
troops in Africa who had had a difficult time beating six German divisions and ten Italian divisions, suddenly had had to
face in May, 1943, 250 German divisions along the Atlantic
and Mediterranean "walls"?
N ow imagine the opposite contingency and you will see
that even a victorious Rommel could not have done anything
decisive in Egypt with his handful of men if the Germans still
had been thrown back from the Volga to the Donetz.
.
Stalingrad without the slightest doubt must be considered
the hub of the war.
Let us turn to another aspect of the Stalingrad victory.
Against the figures we quoted on German materiel captured
by the Red Army, let us see -how much lend-lease materiel
had been delivered to the U.S.S.R. at the time of Stalingrad.
By December 31, 1942, the United States had sent to the
U.S.S.R.: 2,600 planes; 3,200 tanks; 81,000 trucks (and other
materials). Britain sent 2,600 tanks and 2,000 planes. It is
known that the deliveries in November, 1942, were 13 times
greater than those in January, 1942, On the other hand
no material received after A ugust could have possibly been
used by the Russians at Stalingrad. Thus during the crucial
bade doubtless much less stuff than the above totals was available to the Red Army.
As a matter of fact, Leland Stowe's testimony in his recent
book They Shall Not Sleep is revealing. Mr. Stowe says that
after early June no more convoys arrived in M urmansk until
September (the first American train arrived in Teheran from
the Gulf of Persia with war material for the Red Army only
in March, 1943). On page 227 Mr. Stowe says:
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As a matter of fact, Allied materials could not become
of some decisive quantity in the Soviet Union until the
end of 1942-after the decision at Stali,n grad had already
been settled." (My emphasis-So K.)
Writing of lend-lease help to the U.S.S.R., Prof. George B.
Cressey, of the University of Syracuse, says: "It was Russian planning and Russian equipment which won the victories
of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad." (The Basis of Soviet
Strength, page 247.)
It is interesting to note in connection with the "argument"
about the respective importance of Stalingrad and EI Alamein,
that German tanks, painted sand-yellow for desert fighting appeared at Stalingrad, but no German tanks painted white for
snow-fighting were ever seen at El Alamein.
As to the bombing of German-held Europe from the west
at the time of the Battle of Stalingrad, it could not have
helped much. Between the beginning of the war and May 25,
1943 (i.e., about four months after the end of the Battle of
Stalingrad), the R.A.F. Bomber Command had dropped only
100,000 tons on Germany. The figure for the U.S.A.A.F. was
certainly less. The total was probably about one-tenth of the
total dropped on Germany from the west to the end of the
war.

THE THIRD PERIOD
During the Battle of Stalingrad the Germans attempted to
relieve their trapped Sixth Army Group with an attack by
some eleven divisions from the southwest. The counter-blow
was a ghastly failure.
During the third period of the war, preceding the Battle of
Kursk, the Germans repeated that maneuver in FebruaryMarch, south of the Donetz. Here they succeeded in stopping
the Soviet offensive which was aiming at the elbow of the
Dnepr and in saving their own troops in the Donetz Basin.
This offensive between the Dnepr and Kharkov, in the early
spring of 1943, was the last successful limited offensive of the
German Army. It was successful in a strictly limited sense: it
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saved the German troops in the Donbas from a huge trap,. it
permitted the Germans to hold and exploit the mines of the
Donbas for another eight months (until September, 1943), it
checked the Soviet offensive which had rolled uninterruptedly
from Stalingrad almost to the Dnepr, a distance of roughly
400 miles in three months, it recaptured Kharkov. After that
. and up to the end of 1944 the Germans staged counter-blows
on a smaller scale-at Uman, in the Ukraine; at Kiev; in
Galicia; at Warsaw; in the Baltic region; at Avaranches, in
Normandy, in the Belgian Bulge; at Budapest; but not one
of them succeeded in delaying their opponents more than for
a few weeks and most of them ended for the Germans in disaster. An analysis of these multiple operations of the Wehrmacht conclusively shows that after November 19, 1942, the
German Army was not able successfully to take the offensive
on a strategic scale. The three great German offensive blows
were delivered roughly with two-and-a-hal£ to three score divisions at a time, in 1941 (Moscow), in 1942 (Stalingrad), and
in 1943 (Kursk-Orel); of these the latter was a complete failure
as we shall see presently. The counter-blows we mentioned
before were conducted by the Germans with an average of
between 12 and 20 divisions and, therefore, cannot be considered of strategic scope. Three big offensives and a dozen offensive-defensive counter-blows-such are the highlights of the
German operations in Europe after June 22, 1941. Of these
fifteen operations, thirteen (three large ones and ten small
ones) were directed against the Red Army and two small ones
against the Western Allied armies. No German operation was
successful after the Donetz local counter-blow in February,
1943 (I do not count a small and temporary success like Kassarine Pass, in Tunisia). This is important to remember in
considering the last German strategic offensive attempt in the
summer of 1943, around the Kursk Arc.
Concurrently with and immediately after Stalingrad, the
Red Army had lifted the blockade of Leningrad, and had
recaptured Rostov (which had been lost to the enemy for the
second time in 194 2). It had pushed a salient beyond Kursk
between the German-held strongholds of Orel and Kharkov.
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~he Germans were afraid of this great salient which had
been built up into a gigantic fortress (they were right because
in fact the Kursk salient when it started rolling in early
August, 1943, ended up 21 months later non-stop, goo miles '
and 1,100 miles to the west, on the Elbe and the Muerz.)
The German High Command decided on a minimum and
a maximum plan. Plan-minimum envisaged nipping off the
Soviet salient at Kursk and the destruction of the Soviet
armies concentrated there. Plan-maximum envisaged, in addition, a breakthrough of the Soviet front and a new march
on Moscow.
Just before this offensive, the Germans, sensing that the
Western Allies, Italy-bent, would not invade France, concentrated 207 German and 50 satellite divisions on the Soviet
front. Just as the Western Allies were taking their first steps
in Sicily, the storm broke over the Kursk salient.
Reviving the pincer-pattern, 17 armored divisions and 21
infantry and motorized divisions struck at the Kursk arc from
both flanks (from Orel and from Belgorod). No such concentration of tanks had hitherto been assembled. (It was matched
and bettered only by the Russians during the Oder breakthrough in April, 1945).
The German grand offensive lasted little more than two
weeks and penetrated less than 20 miles in depth·. As the
battle developed toward its climax, the Germans threw in
one-fifth of the 250-odd divisions they had on the Eastern
Front. A month after the start of the enemy offensive the
Red Army had not only repelled it, but had captured Orel
and Belgorod (the Western Allies captured Catania in Sicily
on that very same day, August 5). The Germans on the
Eastern Front had suffered in one month the following losses
in men killed and captured (not counting the wounded),
and materiel destroyed and captured:
Men .... .. .... . ........... .... . ... . ... .. 13 2,00P
Planes .. . .. . .... . . . .. . ... . ..... . ... . .. . . 2,500

• Between July 5 and 14 the Germans lost 40,000 killed, 1,392 planes
and 2,919 tanks.
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Tanks .. . ... . .. . ... . . . . .. .. .. . . ... ... . . .
Guns . . ... .. · ······· ····· · · ·· ···· · ·· ··· .
Motor vehicles .. . .... . . . ... . .. . . ... .. ... .

5,200
2,800
11,000

The German front was broken through in the widest strategic sense of the word. The Soviet offensive spread from the
Kursk bulge to the Dnepr and up and down its course, from
the Smolensk Gap to the Black Sea. Generally speaking, after
Kursk the Red Army never stopped anymore until it reached
Berlin and Vienna, except to repel occasional German counterthrusts and for regrouping. After Kursk, never was the entire
Eastern front quiet again, not even during the floods of
Spring (in March, April and May, 1944, the Red Army
marched to the Carpathians and recaptured Odessa and
Sevastopol). After its terrific defeat at Kursk the Wehrmacht
could only retreat with occasional attempts at making a stand
on such exceptionally advantageous defensive positions as
the Dnepr, the Dnestr, the Vistula, the Danube and the
Oder and in the Carpathians. In fact~ the ((march to the Spree"
was on.
While the Battle of the Kursk Arc was developing (together
with the subsequent Soviet offensive) and the Eastern Front
was keeping some 250 enemy divisions busy, fighting on other
fronts was engaging a score of enemy divisions in Sicily and
Italy and another score or so in Yugoslavia. Thus, in the
summer of 1943 the ratio between .the "volume of fighting"
on the Easter n Front and on all the other fronts of Europe
was more than 6: 1. This ratio will appear still more dramatic
when one looks on the map at Sicily, Southern Italy and Yugoslavia on one hand and at the land mass between the Arctic
Ocean and the Black Sea on the other.
Let us now look at the amount of lend-lease materials received by the U.S.S.R. up to the end of 1943, i.e., the stuff
that was used by the Red Army during the campaigns of
1943 (we have already seen that nothing could have been
used at Moscow and very little in the days of Stalingrad and
the 1942-1943 winter).
FEA chief Leo T. Crowley reported in March, 1944 (New
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York Times, March 12, 1944) that up to December, 1943, the
U.S.S.R. had received lend-lease valued at $4,241,000,000, or
slightly more than one quarter of the total amount lent and
leased by the U.S.A. to Allied powers. This amount represented as far as munitions of war go, 7,800 planes, less than
5,000 tanks, 33,000 "jeeps," 173,000 trucks, and other materials
such as machines, food, special metals, etc. (This total by
far did not reach the U.S.S.R. in time for the Battle of
Kursk.)
It is enough to turn back to the statistics of Soviet materiel
losses during the first two years of the war to realize that this
was a small, though welcome, addition to the Soviet arsenal.
(During the first two years of war, the Red Army lost 35,000
guns, 30,000 tanks and 23,000 planes and inflicted on the
Germans the following losses: 56,500 guns, 42,400 tanks and
43,000 planes.)

THE FOURTH PERIOD
This is the period beginnipg after the Battle of the Kursk
Arc and ending with the German capitulation at Berlin. Almost two years of fighting are lumped together into one "period," by me, because the campaigns of these two ' years are
characterized by one common feature: the Red Army was always on the offensive and the German Army was always on the
defensive. This "Kursk-Berlin" period can be subdivided into
two distinct phases: during the first period (August, 1943June, 1944) the Red Army continued to fight the German
Army virtually alone, thus rounding out almost three years
during which the Western Allies fought only against minor
enemy forces, while during the second phase the European
war assumed its long-awaited two-front pattern.
Following the victory of Kursk-Orel-Kharkov, the Red
Army offensive spread along the front and in one sweep
reached and hurdled the lower half of the Dnepr and
reached the upper Dnepr. In the Fall it cleared the Donetz
Basin. In the winter it broke the Germans on the Leningrad
front and reached the N arova and the Lake of Pskov. In
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the Spring it reached the Dnestr and crossed into Rumania
over the Prut and reached the Carpathians. It cleared the
Crimea and recaptured Sevastopol. In early June it crushed
Finland. Thus, by the time the Western Front was opened
by the Western Allies on June 6, 1944, the Germans in the
East had already lost everything they had been fighting for.
They had been frustrated in the attainment of all their strategic goals in the U.S.S.R., both unlimited and limited.
During this phase, the Germans were keeping well over
three-quarters of their divisions in the East because they well
knew that the Western Allies were not ready to do anything
except continue to fight the slogging campaign in Italy where
they still faced the same twenty-odd enemy divisions, with the
Yugoslav Army holding almost as many divisions with no
tanks, a handful of planes, and no shipping to bring supplies.
During this phase of the war the aerial offensive against
Germany from the West was only beginning to hamper the
German industrial effort, but the Red Army could not possibly
have felt its effects until the end of 1944 and the beginning
of 1945, if then. I say "if then" because the study of the
operations of the latter period (such as the Battle of the
Vistula and the Battle of Hungary) shows very plainly that
the Germans did not lack equipment. This is proved, among
other things, by the fact that during their defensive counterblow near Budapest around 'C hristmas time, 1944, they were
able to squander as many as 200 tanks a day during more
than a week. An army which feels the industrial pinch cannot
afford such lavishness.
On March 7, 1944, we see a New York Times headline:
"Air war at peak . . . loose 2,000 tons on German capital."
On May 2, 1944-"81,400 tons hit Nazis in April." On June
2-"118,940 tons rained on Europe in May." July 3, 1944"122,750 tons poured on the Germans in June."
Thus, from these figures we can draw the conclusion that
of the roughl y 1,500,000 tons dropped on Germany and
Europe during the whole war (from the West) less than
500,000 tons were dropped during the time when the Red
Army was retreating from the Bug to the Volga and advanc-
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ing from the Volga to the Upper Dnepr and the Dnestr,
almost reaching its pre-1939 border and crossing it at some
points. In November, 1943, the RAF and the U.S. Eighth
Air Force dropped 13,000 tons according to the New York
Times~ December 10, 1943; during August, September and
October, 1943, the RAF and USAAF together dropped
70,000 tons; a number of other figures, such as a weight of
17,000 tons dropped during the "peak week" of February 13,
1944, as reported in the New York Times of May 6, 1945,
all show that the really heavy bombing of Germany started
after the Red Army had already set Germany on her heels
by wresting from her all the fruits of her conquests in the
East.
The tonnage of bombs dropped on German-held Europe
from the west before D-Day (probably not more than half a
million tons during roughly thirty months) is interesting
to compare with the 66,000 tons of shells fired against the
enemy by American forces during less than 3 months (82 days)
on Okinawa. The area of Okinawa is less than 500 square
miles. The area of German-held Europe was more than
1,000,000 square miles: Europe in two years got only eight
times the explosives the pin-point of Okinawa got in 82 days.
The above figures conclusively prove the correctness · of
the statement by Soviet Professor S. Vishnev, who says (Soviet
Info'r mation BuZletin~ July 7, 1945): "Besides weapons and
materiel, the Allies rendered economic support to the Red
Army, weakening Germany's war potential by blockade and
aerial bombing. Germany"s industrial centers hit by the
Allied Air Forces were largely reduced, but the effect was not
felt by the Soviet Armies before 1944-1945."
Thus, up to the end of the second phase of the Fourth
Period, i.e., up to the moment of the commencement of the
final drive from two si~es, the Red Army had received only
very scant assistance from any quarter and its emergence on
a line running from Viborg to Narva, Gomel, Sarny, Czernowitz and Odessa must be credited overwhelmingly to the
Soviet Union's own war effort.
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The two-front war against Germany began at long last on
June 6, 1944. This last phase was to last for eleven months . .
The invasion of France was followed 17 days later by the
Red Army offensive across the Upper Dnepi' (the Battle of
Belorussia). While the Western Allies were battling in the
Cotentin Peninsula (the Battle of the Hedgerows), the Red
Army crashed from the Dnepr to the Bug and Neman, to
the near approaches to Riga, to the Upper Vistula, and to the
San. At the time of the Allied breakthrough at St. Lo, in
Norma!ldy, the Red Army had cleared all Soviet territory
except for tbe western half of the Baltic region and the
southern part of Bessarabia.
The over-all line-up of enemy forces during this campaign
was approximately this: 100 enemy divisions facing the Allies
in Western Europe, Italy and Yugoslavia; at least 240 enemy
divisions facing the Red Army on a curving I,300-mile front
from the mouth of the Narova (Gulf of Finland) to the mouth
of the Dnestr (not counting the still active front in Lapland
where action stopped only toward the end of October). The
estimate of 240 enemy divisions operating on the Eastern
Front in the summer of 1944 is based on the fact that the
Germans themselves said they had 200 divisions between the
Bal tic and the Carpathians alone, as well as on the incontrovertible fact that in the battles of encirclement at Minsk
(July) and Kishinev-Jassy (August), as well as in Kurland,
the Germans lost close to 55 divisions encircled and annihilated, or blockaded and left to rot until they surrendered
(in Latvia) in May, 1945.
After August 1, while the Allied armies were sweeping
almost without opposition from St. Lo to the German border,
the Red Army was fighting for every town and village, for
every marshy little river right up to the border of East
Prussia and Czechoslovakia. While the Allies fought a counterblow by six German divisions at A ~anches, the Red Army
warded off a counterblow by 30 German divisions before
Warsaw.
As the Allies entered Paris amid cheers, the Red Army encircled, near Jassy, 15 German infantry divisions and several
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Rumanian divisions and shattered seven German divisions
which tried to break through to their encircled troops. The
Germans lost, at Jassy, 106,000 prisoners with 13 generals,
830 tanks, 3,500 guns and 33,000 motor vehicles. This operation ushered in the brilliant march to Vienna which upset
the entire German defense plan by attracting German strategic
reserves to the southern wing of the front, and forcing them to
weaken their Italian front by the withdrawal of several divisions which were rushed into Hungary.
In December, von Rundstedt began his ill-starred counteroffensive against the Allies in the "Belgian Bulge." While this
battle with 20 German divisions was raging, the Red Army
was warding off a similar blow in the Budapest-Lake Balaton
region. Rundstedt managed to escape from the Bulge with his
best troops, but in Budapest almost a score of German and
Hungarian divisions never got out of the trap.
While the Allied Armies were regrouping and recuperating .
from the Rundstedt blow, the Red Army opened its big winter
offensive on the Vistula (Jan. 15, 1945), in East Prussia, and
in Czechoslovakia.
When the Western Allies made their famous crossing of
the Rhine, at Remagen (early March, 1945), the Red Army
had already reached the Oder and was getting ready to strike
at Vienna.
At last the pay-off was at hand.
In the West the Germans offered only sporadic, spotty and
uncoordinated resistance to the Allied Armies. Up to April,
1945, any large movement of German troops took place usually
from West to East. Now German divisions were scurrying
westward ... to surrender to the Americans and British.
While the Allies were marching, against little opposition, to
the Elbe, the Red Army effected its massive breakthrough on
the Oder (end of April) and began the battle of Berlin
against 100-odd German divisions. Simultaneously, the East
Prussian pocket was liquidated and the enemy defenses were
broken through in Upper Silesia and in Austria.
The Red Army battered its way into Berlin a day before
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the British entered Hamburg and three days before General
Patton roared into Linz. During five days after the German
capitulation (May 8), the Red Army fought a whole German
army group across the western part of Czechoslovakia. The
last shots of the war were fired on the Eastern Front on
May 13, 1945·

The Cost
HUMAN LOSSES

Only the figures on American and British Empire losses
have been made public. Taking only the killed, missing and
prisoners, we see that U.S. losses are roughly 450,000 of which
it is estimated that six-sevenths were incurred in the European- .
African theatre of war. Thus, in the war against Germany,
American casualties (killed, prisoners and missing) are about
375,000 men.
British Empire casualties (killed, prisoners and missing
both in the Armed Forces and civilians) are roughly R65,000,
of which probably 700,000 were incurred in the war against
Germany and her satellites. Thus the total of Western Allied
casualties (killed, prisoners and missing) in the war against
Germany is slightly more than 1,000,000 men.
Soviet military casualties have not been computed for the
whole war. We know officially only that during the first three
years of the war the Soviet Armed Forces lost (in killed, prisoners and missing) 5,300,000 men. Considering that during the
fourth year of the war such gigantic battles as the Battle of
Belorussia, Poland, the Danube, East Prussia and Germany
were fought, it is reasonable to assume that the Soviet casualties for the whole war are not far from 6.5 million men. Thus
we have a ratio of 6.5: 1 as between Anglo-American casualties
and Soviet casualties.
As to casualties among the civilian population of the Soviet
regions which were occupied by the Germans-"Thou alone,
o Lord, knoweth their numbers."
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MATERIAL COST AND LEND-LEASE
The total amount in lend-lease materials sent by the U.S.A.
to the U.S.S.R. through to April 1, 1945 is as follows (in
thousands of dollars):
Ordnance and ammunition ... .. . . ... .. . 79 8,343
Aircraft and parts .. .... . . .. ,. .. .. .. .. . . 1,495,966
Tanks and parts ..... .... . . . ...... . . . . 460 ,059
Motor vehicles and parts .. ... .... . .. .. . 1,157,06 4
Watercraft . .. . ... . . . . .. .. ... . .. ... . . . 24 0 ,159
All munitions . . ... .... ... ...... .. 4,151,591
, Petroleum products . . . .. . .. . . ..... .. . .
84,878
Industrial materials and products. . . .... 2,700,223
Agricultural products . . . . . . .. ......... 1,473,003
Total . .. . . ... .. . . . .... . . . . . . ... .. 8,409,695
This total of almost eight and one-half billion dollars represents, among other thing:
Planes . . ........ . . . . .... ... . . ... . .... . .
Tanks ..... . . .... . .. . . .. .. .. . ..... . . .. .
Tons of explosives . . .. . . . . .. . .... . .. .... 312,000
Motor vehicles of all types .. ... ..... .... . 406,000
If one adds to this the lend-lease material received by the
U.S.S.R. from or through Great Britain, the total will amount
to $10,000,000,000.
The above figures have to be viewed against the background of other figures, such as the following:
The U.S.A. spent on the war close to $300,000,000,000.
Thus, even if one should include lend-lease from Britain, the
U.S.S.R. received slightly more than three cents of every
dollar spent on the war by the U.S.A.
According to the estimate of French Minister Pierre Cot,
the U.S.S.R. spent the equivalent of 170,000,000,000 gold
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dollars on the war against Germany. Thus, if we accept the
figure (and it is more than plausible, if one takes into consideration the enormous amount of fighting done by the Red
Army) we see that lend-lease equipment and materials
amounted to less than 6 per cent of what the Soviet Union
manufactured itself and used in the war.
It also must be considered that a substantial part of lendlease went to the Soviet Far East to bolster the Far Eastern
Red Armies for the eventual struggle against the Japanese
Army. Thus, not all the munitions which were lent and leased
to the U.S.S.R. went to the German front.
It must also be remembered that the above figures represent
stuff delivered f.o.b. at American ports. How much stuff was
sunk in the terrible run to Murmansk, especially in the
early months, we don't kno"w.
And here is another angle to the question: On the basis
of Soviet material battle losses during the first three years of
the war only (3°,000 planes, 49,000 tanks and 48,000 guns), we can surmise that such Soviet losses for the' whole war were
no less than 35,000 planes, 60,000 tanks and 60,000 guns.
Now, the Red Army obviously not only replaced its losses,
but added to its equipment as compared with the first years
of the war. Thus, taking the losses to be one-third of the stuff
available at the time, we see that Soviet industry must have
produced no less than four times the above figures of losses
(inclusive of replacements) i.e' 7 a total of some 140,000 planes,
240,000 tanks and 240,000 guns.
These figures are borne out by the following fragmentary
data: one Soviet tank factory alone produced 35,000 tanks
during the war; one factory alone built 15,000 planes; the
Stalin Ordnance Works alone produced 95,000 guns of all
calibres.
Looking at the lend-lease figures of materials shipped to
the U.S.S.R. during the battles of Moscow and Stalingrad,
we see that the amount could not have had an appreciable
influence on their outcome. (Practically no materials had
alTived during the Battle of Moscow. As to the battle of
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Stalingrad, only about one-seventh of all lend-lease stuff
had reached the U.S.S.R. at that time.)
At the time of the Battle of Kursk when the -last German
offensive attempt was shattered, the U.S.S.R. had been allotted
only slightly more than $2,000,000,000 of stuff (the Uniteq
Kingdom had already received two and one-half times that
amount).
Thus we see very plainly that the decisive battles of Moscow
and Stalingrad were won almost exclusively with Soviet stuff.
The victory in the Battle of Kursk was made easier by lendlease.
It must, of course, be understood that such inconspicuous
lend-lease items as those entered as "miscellaneous" probably
contain precious alloy metals, vitamins, or sulfa drugs, etc.,
whose value in the struggle cannot be measured in tons or
dollars because they mean the saving of human lives through
tougher tank armor, better diet, medication, etc.
In order to grasp the whole idea of -lend-lease, one must
understand its basic meaning: the U.S.A. in 1941, 1942, and
, even 1943, was not able to put enough trained men in the
field to use all the stuff they could produce under the peaceful conditions prevailing in the U.S.A., with their immense
resources and industrial establishments. It was natural then
for the U.S.A. to give part of what it produced to those men
who were on the spot, were trained to use the stuff and were '
in a position to use it to the best advantage.
, Some of the stuff lent and leased was as important, to take
a trivial and homely example, as a box of matches while
camping. One man cut, trimmed and hauled the wood for
the camp fire. Another brought the matches. True, it would
have been possible to light the fire by rubbing sticks, but it
would have taken so much longer. Without the 400,000
trucks and other vehicles received by the Red Army it would
undoubtedly have moved slower. Without vitamins and lard
it would have been weaker. Without sulfa drugs more men
would have suffered more. And so on down the line.
Lend-lease was well given and well used. This means that
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it was to the mutual advantage and all talk about Hcharity,"
or "ingratitude" is so much nonsense.
The object of talking about it at all, except for the record,
is to show that on one hand lend-lease was highly important,
on the otber that the U.S.S.R. did not in the least "live on
lend-lease 'only" because it produced, on its own resources,
90 per cent of some items, 75 per cent of others, 100 per cent
of still others, probably an average of 95 per cent of all it used
in this war (this estimate is based on the figures of .the probable total cost of the war to the U.S.S.R. and on the value of
lend-lease received).
I think that Generalissimo Stalin put' the whole thing clearly '
when he said on June 12, 1945, in a message to President
Truman:
"On the day of the third anniversary of the conclusion
of the Soviet American agreement on the principles to
be applied to mutual assistance in the conduct of the war
against aggression, I beg. you and the U.S. Government
to accept this expression of gratitude from the Soviet
Government and myself personally.
"This agreement, on the basis of which the U.S.
throughout the whole war in Europe, through lend-lease,
has been supplying the S. U. with arms, strategic materials and food, played an important part in and made a
considerable contribution to the successful conclusion of
the war against the common enemy, Hitlerite Germany."
And Soviet People"s Commissar of Finance Arseny Zverev
said, in presenting the 1945 budget to the Supreme Soviet
(Parliament):
"In making a preliminary review of the financing of
the Red Army, we must remember the substantial assistance received in 1944 as well as during this year from our
Allies, in the form of armaments, materiel and foodstuffs."
It would be unfair to deny that lend-lease assistance was
"substantial," but it would be just as unfair to claim that it
was these supplies, which, thrown into the scales, turned the
balance in favor of Russia simply because the balance had
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already been basically turned In the Battles of Moscow and
Stalingrad.
Lend.-Iease to the U.S.S.R. did not win the war, but it
speeded its victorious conclusion.

The Role of Air Power
In speaking of the role of air power in the war against
Germany, it is impossible to omit the so-called Battle of
Britain. Without in the least d~tracting from the staunchness
and courage of the British people;-qualities which are known
all over the world-in a battle which made "so many owe so
much to so few," this battle must be viewed in its true perspective. In the brilliant phrase of Churchill we find the very
negation of . the erroneous idea that the so-called Battle of
Britain could have won the war. No handful of heroic young
men can win a modern global war. What British resistance did
was to prevent the war from being dragged out for many
years longer than it did, but it did not win it for the 'simple
reason that it could not win it.
The notion that Britain "stood alone" and repelled the
Nazi flood from its shores also is erroneous. The myth of the
Gennan invasion attempts in the late summer of i940 has
been disp~lled. The famous invasion ba~ges photographed by
British fliers in the mouth of the Schelde turned out to be
only fifty in number and were hardly designed to carry the
invasion. Another myth-the story of the wall of fire around
Britain's shores burning to death the invasion ships and
troops has also been exploded. Such a wall of fire was prepared and we even saw it in the movies in 1945, but no German invasion was burned in the purely experimental holocaust.
But the fact that the Germans did not invade Britain
remains incontrovertible. Why <l:idn't they .do it?
History gives us an example and a parallel which is 'worth
examining, but with all the caution with which historical
parallels and "repetitions" should be approached.
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In early 1805 Napoleon had collected an army of 130 ,000
and was building 2,000 special flat-bottomed boats for the
invasion of England. All this was concentrated at the camp
of Boulogne. The British and French fleets in those days
played a part not unsimilar to that which aviation played
in 1940. Some people think that it was the defeat of the
French fleet under Villeneuve at Trafalgar by Nelson which
saved England. But the fact is that Napoleon suddenly lifted
his camp at Boulogne in the summer of 1805 (weeks before
Trafalgar) and marched to the Danube and the victories of
Elchingen, Ulm and Austerlitz. He turned his back on England in order to face the threat of the Austro-Russian coalition on the Danube.
Now, in 1940 the situation was not without parallel if one
considers that precisely at the time when France was collapsing and Germany seemed free to turn its entire armed might
against almost defenseless England, the Red Army advanced
to the Baltic, to the border of East Prussia, to the Prut and
the mouths of the Danube, taking up its "initial position"
for the coming epic struggle against Germany and Germanheld Europe. Hitler read "the writing on the Eastern Wall."
It is clear that this was the determining factor which made
the modern "Napoleon" give up any idea of the invasion of
England, and start preparing for his march to the East.
Thus, it is clear that England was not in the least "alone"
in that summer of ' 1940. The fact that so many Englishmen
did not know it makes their heroic struggle still more glorious in the eyes of the world. Between August 8 and October 31,
1940, the British fought off a part of the Luftwaffe (but not
all of it because the rest was watching the eastern ramparts).
The British lost one out of every five houses destroyed or
damaged, they lost several thousand people. They downed
2,375 German planes and lost about 750 themselves. They
lost 375 airmen killed. But their industries continued to grow
and Britain emerged from the battle with a reorganized and
rejuvenated army, because she had not been invaded and,
except for the Channel Islands, FlO German 'foot was set on
British soil. The key to that fact is to be found in Tallin,
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Riga, Kaunas and Kishinev, into which the Red Army
marched at that time.
I have shown in preceding chapters that the aerial assault
on German-held Europe could not have had any appreciable
influence on the land war on the Eastern Front either in 194 1,
1942, or 1943. Thus, it is clear that the Soviet victories of
Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk and on the Dnepr were won
without any appreciable assistance from the air power of
the western Allies in a wide over-all sense (however, it is possible, of course, that, for example, a British air blow at the
port of Rostock did hamper German communications on the
Leningrad front for awhile). Now what about the campaigns
of 1944? Were they materially assisted by Western air power?
Numerous highly paid pressure salesmen for aviation concerns' sanguine prime-ministers, certain enthusiastic air generals with a juvenile outlook on war, as well as numerous
headline hunters have been trying ever since 1943 to sell the
world the idea that air power, almost alone, was turning the
trick.
Chief Air Marshal Harris said in 1943: "Every ton of
bombs dropped on German industries will save the lives of
ten United Nations soldiers when the invasion comes." According to this statement, some fifteen million United Nations
soldiers were saved by the bombing of Germany which is
about twice the number they lost altogether, and about three
times the number the western Allies put in the field. The
absurdity of this assertion does not need any explanation.
Fawning and servile Nazi generals and industrialists, diplomats and even hausfrausJ trying to ingratiate themselves with
the Western conquerors at the expense of the Eastern conquerors, screamed, mumbled and whispered in a chorus:
"You, Americans, won the war with your air power. We
would never have been beaten if it were not for your
bombers."
On the other hand there are some factual statements and
documents which throw a realistic light on the question of the
role of strategic bombing on the German war effort during
the years 1944 and 1945. Here are some of them:
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John McCorm~ck of the New York Times reported from
Nuernberg on April 30, 1945, that two industrialists of the
gigantic Siemens-Sch.ucke.rt Co. st~ted that their company's
production reached zts hzgh peak zn I944·
In the preceding chapters we have shown that the Germans
used military equipment with great lavishness as late as December, 1944 (at Budapest, for instance, and later on, in East
Prussia, in Poland, and on the Oder). Obviously they were
not short of planes, tanks, guns, shells, steel, oil, etc.
However, such reasoning might not sound convincing to
some.
Let us turn to various statements by Allied authorities who
now see that the main difficulties confronting German industry are not so much plants and machines, but fuel and
manpower.
For instance, Drew Middleton cabled to the New York
Times (July 15, 1945), from Frankfort-on-the-Main:
f

"The factories, it will be argued, are, however, largely
intact and capable of being rehabilitated into full production in the near future. This isn't so. Considered
against the background of German economy today, they
cannot be expected to return to production for years to
come. For industry includes not only the plant and physical assets but fuel and labor as well. And in Germany
today the two principal shortages are coal and manpower,
shortages which cripple every part of German economy."
Before the end of the war, especially in 1944, these crippling factors operated only partially. On the other hand the
fact that German factories are "largely intact" is confirmed.
Coal became scarce when it was seized. Men became scarce
when they were killed and captured.
However, the most convincing document is a statement by
Senator Harley M. Kilgore (C. P. Trussell's Washington dispatch to the New York Times~ August 8, 1945) in which he
said that captured documents of the German Ministry of
Armaments and 'tVar Production (the reports were captured
in the spring of 1945) showed that "in 1944 three times as
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many armored fighting vehicles, more than three times as
many fighter-bombers and eight times as many night bombers
had been produced as in 1942 . . . . In 1944 coal mining in
Germany was only slightly lower than in 1942, crude steel
only 11 per cent lower. Additional power plants were made
available in 1944.... By the autumn of 1944 sufficient reserves
of material had been accumulated, with the result that, in
spite of more difficult conditions in the basic industry . . .
the output of armaments could be maintained and in some
cases even increased. . . .
"Taking the basis of 100 per cent in 1942, hard coal production in 1943 increased by 8 per cent. It was 11 per cent
less last year. The production of aluminum increased by 3
per cent in 1943, and in 1944 by 11 per cent 'more .... If the
production of powder in 1942 be considered 100 per cent, it
increased in 1943 to 158 per cent and reached 171 per cent
.in 1944. Forty-five per cent more explosives was produced in
1943 and 75 per cent more in 1944 than in 1942."
Here are some facts submitted to the Kilgore Committee by
investigators who have returned from Germany to report on
the defeated nation's industrial capacity and the effects of
air bombing:
1. Germany today has 4,000,000 tons of machine tools and a
vast undamaged capacity of producing more.
2. The iron and steel industry, productive capacity 25,000,000 tons a year, can be restored with only minor repairs.
3. The -great chemical and dye industry-including that part
manufacturing explosives-is only slightly damaged.
4. The synthetic rubber industry can produce 10,000 tons
a year.
5. If the war had lasted six months more the entire oil
refining and storage industry would have been underground,
safe from all bombing (this was before the atomic bomb
was announced).
"The total German productive capacity affected by the
bombing," sums up London's Tribune (July 20) "was about
20 per cent; less than half the earlier expert estimates by
Bomber Command Public Relations.
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"These are hard facts. They show that bombing did not
win the war, contrary to what each and all of the captured
German generals hastened to assure us.
"Bombing did contribute to final victory, but essentially so
only when it was harmonized with land operations." (In Fact~
August 20, 1945·)
Thus, we see that even in 1944 and in the beginning of
1945, strategic bombing did not reduce materially the power
of Germany to resist and that the common victory of the
Allies must be chiefly credited to the valor, skill and power
of their armies. It follows from this, in the light of all the
foregoing, that the Red Army carried the overwhelming
burden of the war against Germany and her satellites from
June 22, 1941, until June 6, 1944, or during almost three
years. It carried the larger part of the burden from June,
1944, right up to V-E Day.

The Soviet Air Force
Soviet military doctrine never envisaged air power as something which could bring a decision by itself. The Soviet Air
Force is closely integrated with and in the Army and Navy.
Its main function was not strategic bombmg, but close support
of the land operations. The plane was not considered as a
"thing in itself," but as a member of a close-knit team working on land, sea and in the air.
The record of the Soviet Air Force is nothing to be dismissed with a shrug. On the basis of the known figure of 60,000 German planes downed on the Eastern Front during the
first three years of war, it is reasonable to assume that Soviet
fliers and AA-defenses have disposed of approximately 80,000
German planes during the whole war.
Information about the work of the Soviet Air Force is fragmentary. But some of these fragments can give one an idea
of what the Soviet fliers did.
.
For instance we know that in the Spring of 1943 Soviet fliers
had to fight three large-scale air battles. The Germans massed
2,000 planes over the Kuban area, picked squadrons at that.
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More than 100 air battles were fought here every day. Soviet
fliers destroyed more than half of the enemy planes and maintained their initiative.
Just before the Battle of Kursk, the Germans launched
massed air raids on Rostov, Kursk, Yaroslavl, Gorky and other
cItIes. Kursk alone was raided repeatedly by 500-600 enemy
bombers. All onslaughts were repelled with huge losses to the
Germans.
During the Battle of Kursk itself, i.e., during its first days,
more than 1,000 German planes were downed.
Right from the start of the Battle of Belorussia int" the summer of 1944, the Luftwaffe was swept out of the skies by the
Soviet fliers.
Soviet fliers and AA-defenses destroyed throughout the war
an average of more than 50 German planes per day.

The Soviet Navy
The four years of struggle of the Soviet Navy in theatres so
close to land differed markedly from classic naval wars. There
were no grand naval battles between the main forces of the
opposing fleets. N either were there usual lulls in fighting
which inevitably follow major engagements.
The Baltic, Black and Barents Seas extended along the
1,800-mile flanks of the vast land front where the outcome of
the war was being decided. Naturally, operations at sea were
subordinated to the objectives of the land front.
The principal task of the Soviet Navy was to facilitate the .operations
of the army. The Germans on the other hand did not wish
to risk their major naval units against the Soviet Navy because they intended to keep them intact for the future invasion of Britain, when victory over the U.S.S.R. had been won.
The Soviet Navy not only protected the communication
lines to Murmansk as well as across the Black Sea, but it took
part in countless amphibious operations. Its river flotillas did
yeoman work hand in hand with the Red Army.
Just as in the case of the Soviet Air .Force, there are no
comprehensive data on the work of the Soviet Navy as yet.
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However, fragmentary data are available and they give a fairly
good idea of the whole.
.
In the summer of 1942 Soviet submarines sank more than
60 German transports in the Baltic (total displacement500,000 tons).
.
, . .
During the five weeks precedIng the ejectIon of the Germans from the Crimea, 200 German and Rumanian ships
were sunk in the Black Sea.
In the four weeks preceding the ouster of the Germans from
Lapland, more than 150 enemy vessels were sunk in the Far
North.
In March, 1945, 35 0 ,000 tons of enemy shipping was sunk
in the Baltic.
These figures show that the naval war in the East, though
devoid of major naval battles, inflicted trelnendous losses on
the enemy and the Soviet Navy can match the Battle of the
Atlantic with the long and gruelling Battles of the Barents,
Bal tic and Black Seas.

Summary
All of the foregoing has served to demonstrate the following
truths:
The Soviet Union made the major contribution toward
victory in World War II under incomparably more adverse
external conditions than those under which Russia was
defeated in World War I. Obviously, the explanation of this
fact lies in the internal conditions of the country.
1.

Russia had space at its command, in fact more space
than the Soviet Union had '(the central sector of the border
of the Russian Empire in 1914 was some 250 miles farther
from Moscow than the border of the U.S.S.R. was in 1941).
As to the climate-snow, mud, frost, etc.-it can be said the
climate of the Soviet Union is no different than the climate
of Imperial Russia. Furthermore; it must be noted that the
Red Army won its greatest victories in winter, summer,
autumn and spring.
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3. The decisive battles of the Soviet-German war, at,
Moscow and Stalingrad, were won without appreciable assistance either from the Western air war against Germany or
from lend-lease. During the summer battles of 1943 both
categories of help were only beginning to be felt. However, neither type of help became considerable until the fourth
period of the war.
4. The Soviet people have paid the greatest price of all
nations in blood, devastation and treasure. They could stand
the price because of their internal organization. While Imperial Russia was growing weaker and weaker under the
hammerblows of World War I, the Soviet Union was growing
stronger and stronger in the war against Germany and its
satellites. This radical and decisive difference cannot be
credited to the "traditional" heroism of the Russian people,
simply because this quality was inherently present in 1914.
5. The course of the war plainly shows that it was the
Battle of Moscow which killed the blitz and the legend of
German invincibility, and the Battle of Stalingrad which
marked the end of German offensive power.
It now remains to be seen what made this tremendous and
brilliantly successful Soviet war effort possible.
The over-all plan of this effort was broadcast by Marshal
of the Soviet Union Stalin in his radio address of July 3, 1941
(twelve days after the German attack). In this address, conceived in the darkest hours Russia had ever experienced,
Marshal Stalin expressed the supreme confidence of the
Soviet people in victory when he said "this ( the German)
army . . . can be smashed and will be smashed, as were the
armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm."
At the same time he proceeded, calmly and deliberately to
outline the nation's plan of defense.
The concept of the People's War was expressed in the words:
"Side by side with the Red Army, the entire Soviet people
are rising in defense of \ their native land."
The concept of scorched earth was expressed in the words:
"In case of forced retreat of Red Army units ... the enemy
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must not be left a single engine, a single railroad car, not a
single pound of grain or gallon of fuel. . . . All valuable
property ... which cannot be withdrawn must be destroyed
without fail."
The plan for guerrilla (partisan) warfare in the enemy rear
was planned as follows:
"In areas occupied by the enemy, guerrilla units, mounted
and on foot, must be formed, diversionist groups must be
organized to combat the enemy troops, to foment guerrilla
warfare everywhere, to blow up bridges and roads, to damage
telephone and telegraph lines, to set fire to forests, stores and
transports. "
The concept of the G1~eat Patriotic War was expressed thus:
"This war with fascist Germany cannot be considered an
ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies; it is
also a great war of the entire Soviet people against the
German-fascist forces. The aim of this national war in defense
of our country . . . is not only elimination of the danger
hanging over our country, but also aid to all European
people groaning under the yoke of German fascism."
And, prophetically he declared:
"In this war. of liberation we shall not be alone. In this
great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe
and America. . . . Our war for the freedom of our country
will merge with the struggle of the peoples of Europe and
America for their independence, fo! democratic liberties...."
Finally, on popular levies to assist the Red Army in combat,
especially in the defense of great cities (such as Leningrad,
Odessa, Tula, Moscow, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Sevastopol):
" ... popular levies must be raised in every city which is
in danger of enemy invasion, all the working people must
be roused to defend our freedom, our honor, our country.... "
And on the leadership for this great effort:
"In order to insure rapid mobilization of all the forces of
the peoples of the U.S.S.R.... a State Committee of Defense
has been formed in whose hand the entire power of the State
has been vested. The State Committee of Defense has entered
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on its functions and calls upon all our people to rally around
the Party of Lenin-Stalin and around the Soviet Government
so as self-denyingly to support the Red Army and Navy,
destroy the enemy and secure victory."
Here was the grandiose plan which made the Soviet war
effort possible. Titanic effort is reflected in its every word.
Take for instance the four simple words in the sentence
about the destruction or evacuation of valuable propertyuwhich cannot be withdra'iv.n." But great industries 'were withdrawn and "put on wheels" in the Ukraine, in Belorussia, in
Leningrad, and the Donbas. They were moved in July and
August, 1941, hundreds of (and even more than a thousand)
miles to the east and set up in the wilderness with ' such dispatch that their military products-tanks, guns and planes
made their appearance at the front in November, during the
crucial Battle of Moscow. The men who set up these industries
often lived in igloos and snow dugouts for weeks because the
machine shops had to be set up before the dwellings for the
men could be built.
Take, for instance, a tank factory evacuated in July, 1941,
from the vicinity of Kharkov to somewhere around N izhniTaghil in the Urals. The distance by rail is' more than 1,200
miles. The trip east over bombed rail lines, against the tide
of general mobilization moving west, the setting up of factory
buildings in the wilderness, the unspeakable conditions 'o f
cold and privation are an epic in themselves. And in spite
of all that, tanks manufactured in the transplanted factory
made their appearance in the Battle of Moscow, only four
months later.
Perhaps the reader of this account will feel that in setting
up the balance sheet of the war I did not give enough credit
to the American-British Battle of the Atlantic. Of course,
this battle was a miracle <?f organization, dogged determination, magnificent seamanship and all-around heroism, but isn't
it balanced by the Battle of the Great Russian Plain in which
whole industries moved eastward hundreds and thousands of
miles and later their products moved back westward to the
front? Only it was trains that moved instead of ships, with
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men freezing in cabooses and on open platforms instead of on
bridges and decks. Trains being bombed just as the ships
were. The comparison would have been still more apt if the
Allied convoys in the Atlantic had had to carry a lot of industries, say, from France in 1940 to Detroit, and then carry
their products back to the European Front. The Battle of the
Great Russian Plain was a two-way affair.
The famous Soviet weapons such as the rocket-gun "Katusha" (which later acquired quite a "family" in the persons of
"Andryusha," "Ivan the Terrible," etc.), the new Stalin tank,
the new fighters and "stormoviks" (attack planes), the antitank gun, were born in the darkest days of the war, under
the indescribable conditions of the mass migration of heavy
industry to the East.
Stupendous as these achievements are in themselves, the
planning and controlling apparatus is still more stupendous.
There is not the shadow of a doubt that all ,this was planned
and controlled by the Communist Party and its leaders. It was
the Communists who invariably provided the leadership in
partisan warfare and were the mainspring of the total effort in
the people's war. They knew where they were going and
that is why they came to victory, in spite of all adverse conditions and obstacles.
The industrial effort of the Soviet Union under the conditions described above can be fully appreciated by Americans
reared in the tradition of American industrial achievement.
It is a different matter with the concept of the People's War
and Guerrilla War because America has never been invaded,
at least for the last 175 years, and seven or eight generations
of Americans never had the occasion to practice either type
of warfare.
This writer feels that it is not within his modest means to
describe fully the magnificent scope and meaning of Soviet
Guerrilla warfare and People's War-that defense in depth
carried to its ultimate conclusion.
He therefore appends two Soviet accounts, one written by
a Guerrilla chief, the other by an eye-witness of the People's
War. These two documents, which appear at the end of this
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booklet, will tell at least part of the story much better than
this writer ever could hope to do.

Decision in the Far East
The global war was bound to end globally. All the major
Allied powers inevitably were to play a role in the Far
Eastern decision. It had been clear ever since the day when
the Soviet Union cancelled the Japanese concessions in
Northern Sakhalin that the Red Army would take a hand
in the conflict at the proper moment. Now Japan is, militarily
speaking, through. Much has been said and written about the
causes which precipitated the Japanese surrender.
Over-enthusiastic scientists, justly proud of their successes
in unleashing atomic energy, claim that it was the atomic
bomb which finally licked Japan.
Some air generals with a juvenile ou tlook on the facts of
war and life as~ure the world that it was the superfortress
which, basically, did the job.
Here again we have two variants of the old so-called "airpower-alone" theory. But the theory is no more convincing
in Asia than it was in Europe.
It is true that new and powerful factors entered the war
against Japan in such quick succession that it is not easy
to decide which one of them was most instrumental in breaking Japan's "moral back."
Large scale bombing of Japan from the Marianas bases
started in the Spring. Admiral Halsey and his Third Fleet
went on the rampage along the shores of Japan on July 10,
and kept up a constant bombardment for three weeks. The
atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6. The
Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8.
On the face of it, Japan surrendered only after the Soviet
Union declared war. True, she had offered (tentatively) to
surrender in mid-July, but somehow nothing came of it then.
Japan had built up a great continental military and industrial base in Manchuria. She most probably had hopes at least
to prolong the war by holding out there even after Allied
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landings in Japan were made. The military leadership of the
United States was obviously figuring on that because as late
as the first week in August there still was seemingly serious
talk of the need of seven million American troops to subdue
the Japanese army in Asia.
The entry of the Soviet Union into the fray made all this
unnecessary. The ten-day whirlwind campaign of the three Far
Eastern Soviet armies over a theatre of more than half a million square miles was a blow which knocked the props from
under any Japanese idea of continuing resistance outside
Japan itself.
The truth of the matter is that while Soviet military action
in Manchuria shortened the war for the United States, so
the brilliant three-year effort of the armed forces of the United
States made the Soviet whirlwind tempo in Manchuria possible.
.
The main military factor, within the limits of the period of
warfare in the Far East and in the Pacific, contributing to the
defeat of Japan, was the dogged, efficient and heroic march
of American forces from the International Dateline to the
shores of Japan. The greater glory (if glory can be thus
apportioned) goes to the 'U nited States Navy and its correlated
branches of the service.
However, i~ considering the actions from Tarawa to
Okinawa and from Guadalcanal to Borneo and Luzon, we
should not forget the fact that all these countless hard-won
enemy strongholds would have been garrisoned by the Japanese much more strongly, if the Soviet Union had not managed
to keep about a million crack troops on the Manchu border
throughout the European war (even when, in the life and
death struggle before Moscow and Stalingrad, every single
man counted) thus immobilizing a large Japanese army.
Here are some figures on the Japanese contingents in
Manchuria:
193 1 .. .. . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
1933 . . . .... . . . .. . . .. ......... . . .. . . .
Early 1941 . . .... . . . .... ........ . .. . .
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10,500
65,000
400,000

men
men
men

Late 1941 (Battle of Moscow·) . .... ... 1,000,000 men
1,000 tanks
1,500 planes
Only in 1943-1944 did the Japanese forces in Manchuria
decrease somewhat because the Japanese command realized
that it was too late to attack the Soviet Union, but still too
early for the Soviet Union to attack her. But the moment
Germany surrendered, Japanese troops began to stream northward from China into Manchuria to face the threat of the
Red Army thus enabling Chiang Kai-shek's troops to win
some local victories south of the Yangtze.
The question arises now as to why the Japanese did not
attack the Soviet Union at the time of the Battle of Moscow
or the Battle of Stalingrad? The answer is that they had
received two painful lessons in 1938 and 1939 (at Changkufeng and at the Kalkin-Ghol) and had found out that their
army could not stand up against the Red Army even under
circumstances favorable to Japanese arms.
General (now Marshal) Zhukov had, in the summer of 1939
at Kalkin-Ghol, given the Japanese a foretaste of what was
going -to happen to them in the summer of 1945. The result
was that ever since then the Japanese, while keeping more or
less quiet in Manchuria, were compelled to divert to that potential front a great portion of their best troops from the
struggle against the United States and Great Britain. Thus
the contribution of the Soviet Union in the Far Eastern war
goes far beyond the actual fighting which took place after
August 8, I945. It antedates Pearl Harbor by almost three
and one-half years.
This contribution should be viewed against the background
of the terrific struggle of the Red Army against Germany. The
ability to maintain a large and modern, almost self-sufficient
establishment some 5,000 miles from the European front when
every man and every gun were needed before Moscow, Stalingrad and Leningrad, is a great achievement in itself.
• At that time Japan kept in Manchuria half of her artillery, threequarters of her cavalry and two-thirds of her tanks.
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APPENDIX

GUERRILLAS OF THE UKRAINE
By MAJOR GENERAL SIDOR KOVPAK
Twice Hero of the Soviet Union
The guerrillas of the Ukraine had reason to be envious of
their comrades in Byelorussia who were fighting the invaders.
The vast forests and impassable swamps of Byelorussia were
favorable arenas for partisan warfare. Every detachment and
. unit of the guerrillas there had its zone of action and a more
or less stable base in the forests, to which it returned after
an operation.
Steppes predominate in the Ukraine. Facilities for shelter
are rare or non-existent. A blind emulation of the tactics used
by the Byelorussian guerrillas would lead to futile losses.
Other tactics had to be worked out. We discovered that the
most effective method for us was a ' swift and complex maneuver, and we formed our striking units accordingly. Safety lay
in the suddenness of our appearance, the brevity of blows
dealt, and our swift withdrawal to great distances.
September 10, 1941 was a memorable day in my life. A
peaceful civilian chairman of the City Soviet of Workers
Deputies in the town of Putivl, Sumy Region, I made the
decision to remain in the territory occupied by the Germans
and to organize a guerrilla force.
My group at first included 13 people with whom I had
worked at various times and whom I could trust. Two months
passed in minor acts of diversion, a study of the enemy's
tactics, and most of all in establishing contact with the
population.
In guerrilla warfare the sympathy of the people and reliable
and constant contact with them are everything. Such warfare
is inconceivable without the support of the people; if the
population is with you, then you are invincible, no matter
how strong and well-armed the enemy may be. He who fails
to understand this cannot understand the essence of our
strength.

Certain of finding supporters everywhere, and having established . close contact with reliable people in the towns and
villages, our detachment grew rapidly. Without difficulty I
increased the number of my fighting men to 2,500. More could
have been added, but I did not consider this expedient. The
larger the striking units, the more difficult it would be to
maneuver, and the greater the tendency to diminish the pac~
of action.
Constantly in action against the enemy beyond his lines
and in his hinterland, our detachment covered some 15,000
kilometers and several times forced such rivers as the Desna,
Dnepr, Pripet, Prut and Driestr. We moved on an average
of 25 kilometers dailJ. This is no mean distance when one
remembers that our men advanced only by night and on foot;
our horses carried only the wounded and sick, ammunition
and food.
We were well armed with tommy guns and machine guns,
trench mortars and light cannon, including several 76-mm.
guns. Like all guerrillas, we acquired our arms at the expense
of the enemy.
I can say without exaggeration that we grew to be a terror
to the Germans. After striking a sudden blow and routing
one of the enemy garrisons, we would vanish as abruptly as
we had appeared, burning the bridges behind us. The Germans would strike out in all directions, but within a short
time we would hit them again, some 200 to 300 and even 500
kilometers from the former place.
Having acquired considerable battle experience in the war
zone, we began operations in the remote rear of the enemy.
Here are some examples:
In June, 1943, when the Red Army was fighting its historic
battle at the Kursk bulge, we were engaged in an operation .
in the Rovensk Region, some 800 kilometers from the front.
The Germans never expected us here. They had placed a
price on my head long before, but now displayed incredible
generosity. In their newspapers they published a notice that
they would pay 'for my head 100,000 ru hIes in gold or bullion,
as the murderer desired. This was a lot of money and I
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couldn't help feeling a bit flattered. Not once, however, did
the Germans catch me.
Finally they combed the Rovno forests in grand style.
We had had similar experiences on no less than 30 previous
. occasions-and this time too we broke out of the encirclement.
.Pushing westward to surprise the Germans we penetrated to
the oilfields of Drogobych, in the Carpathians. This was in
July, 1943. While the Red Army was crushing the enemy's
defenses at Sumy and. Belgorod, we were destroying oilwells,
cracking plants and pipe-lines in the Carpathians, a thousand
kilometers from the front.
uWieder Kovpak!" (Kovpak again!) screamed the German
newspapers, and this time the enemy sent eight of his picked
regiments and five battalions to intercept us at Drogobych.
They planned to force us against the Carpathian heights. By
a complex maneuver we evaded them and got away in an
easterly direction to the Sluch River. True to our rules, our
partisan units on their way inflicted heavy losses on the
Germans. We approached our rendezvous in seven groups
along a front of 200 kilometers.
All that could prove of value to the enemy was burned and
destroyed:
There are some who say the successes of my detachment
were gained by sheer luck. Luck has been, with us at times, of
course, but it is impossible to beat the enemy again and again
by luck alone. Miracles don't happen in war. Those who are
unable to fight well are soon abandoned by fortune. Guerrilla
actions require creative skill. I remember one occasion when·
fortune seemed to smile exclusively upon the enemy. Pursuing
us, the Germans closed in between the Dnepr and Pripet
Rivers. Here they massed six infantry divisions and two tank
regiments.
Superior in armaments, the enemy also outnumbered us
20 to one. We were pressed against the Pripet and harried
from its surface by five armored tugs and 10 other well-armed
ships. It seemed they had us-and the Germans no doubt
. anticipated the pleasure of an easy victory. Fierce fighting
began, lasting for two days. The situation became puzzling:
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we were beating the Germans, instead of their beating us.
They were never given a chance to beat us. The trick was
simple. Filtering through to the woods, we arose on the
enemy's flanks, struck suddenly, annihilated as many as we
could, and vanished. While our tommy guns mowed the
Germans down, now here and now there, our artillerymen
gave their attention to the enemy boats, and our sappers built
a floating bridge 240 meters long. Destroying the flotilla, we
crossed the river and got away.
This engagement cost the Germans 1,100 dead officers and
men. Our losses were one man killed and four wounded.
This could scarcely be termed luck. The entire operation was
well conceived and skilfully carried out.
My detachment during its period of action annihilated
18,000 German soldiers and officers-including three generals.
We also burned 55,000 tons of oil cached by the Nazis, derailed
many of their trains and wrecked many trucks loaded with
war materials. Our losses have been comparatively small.
Still in action in the Carpathians, my men are adding to
their list of victories day by day.
The following figures may give an idea of the scale of
guerrilla actions in the Ukraine: The main detachments in
the Ukraine, exclusive of communications groups and scouts
in towns and villages, numbered 115,000 men. In all, this
force annihilated 310,000 German soldiers and officers, wrecked
4,060 locomotives and 39,700 freight cars, and blew up or
burned 6,693 trucks, 810 tanks and armored cars, 3 2 4 guns
and 108 aircraft.
The German conquerors hoped to establish themselves
firmly on the steppes of the Ukraine. They dreamed of
colonizing this country of lush pastures where Ukrainian
shepherd slaves would tend the splendid herds for them;
of fertile fields where people would gather great harvests of
wheat for them; of mines where subjugated people would
dig coal and ores for their enslavers.
Things turned out differently, and this was due in a
measure to the part played by the comrades-in-arms of the
Red Army-the Ukrainian guerrillas.
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TDEROADTDROUGDTDESWAMPS
By YURI . NAGIBIN
The old man approached the colonel's dugout by way of a
secret forest path. Many of the trees had been hit by shells,
and were exuding resin and transparent sap through their
wounds. He watched a soldier fit some cups to a stricken birch,
saw them fill rapidly with the clear sap, and silently approved
of the Red Army's thriftiness.
The colonel's dugout was lit by a sooty kerosene lamp.
There were two men inside-the colonel and his aide-de-camp.
The colonel was bent over some papers. The other was playing
a gramophone-the record was "The Blue Scarf." He had
stuffed the sleeve of his quilted jacket into the amplifier, so
that the noise should not disturb the colonel.
\
But he was not even aware of the music. He was reading
and re-reading the message that lay before him. It informed
him that two truckloads of ammunition had got through to
a group that had wedged its way far into the German lines.
But the road was under fire. It was extremely doubtful how
long it could be kept open.
The men, full of ardor after their successful breakthrough,
were marking time and losing momentum. But the command
could not supply enough sappers to lay another road. And
in any case, where could another road be laid, when all around
was impassable, sedge-grown swamp?
There was only one last hope-the villagers of Lyubino
Polye, a little marshland settlement recently liberated from
the Germans. And that was why the colonel had sent for the
old man, the chairman of the village Soviet.
The colonel had grown very fond of the sturdy, clean people
who inhabited these northern places. Taken unawares in their
village by the Germans, they had not remained in their homes
for a single day. The very first night of the occupation they
had picked off the German sentry and gone off to the woods
with their wives and children.
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Even the cripples had crawled off with their fellow-villagers.
The only traitor among the lot-one mangy sheep from an
otherwise sound flock-had his fate decided for him by the
men of Lyubino Polye, who stole into the village under the
noses of the Germans, and did away with him in their
own way.
The people of Lyubino Polye were capable and industrious.
They knew the swamps, knew how to fight them. They knew
how to build a house in the fenlands, how to lay a road or
plan a park. They knew every mood of the swamps.
Furthermore, from ancient times they had been known for
their excellent woodwork. They were cabinet-makers, carpenters, bridge-builders. It was said of them that they had stolen
the soul of a tree, and that was how they knew all the secrets
of wood.
I t was part of the -village tradition that the young men
should specialize in carved cradles, things of wonder and delight. The wood they made those cradles from had a remarkable melodious quality, as though there were lute-strings in
it, so that when the cradles rocked they sang of themselves
and lulled the children to sleep.
In their later years, nearer to the twilight of their lives, the
Lyubino Polye craftsmen turned to road-making and bridgebuilding, and in their old age, by tradition, they made only
coffins. These coffins were dependable, solid affairs, which the
people of the district ordered in advance.

*

*

:1(1

The old man spoke deliberately: "We've talked the matter
over, Colonel, and you needn't worry. You don't need your
sappers. They'll come in handy somewhere else. This r<;>adbuilding job is a simple matter for us."
"But surely you can't manage without help?" the colonel
asked, amazed. "Will you really be able to do it on your own?"
"Well; not like sappers would do it, of course," said the
old man with a discreet smile. "We may even do it a little
better."
The colonel thought. Then he sighed. He stood up and
spoke firmly. "Quite impossible, I'm afraid. The zone will be
.
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under fire, and enough of your folk have been killed already
iij. the guerrilla detachments."
"My dear boy, people are like corn. You can grow a whole
field from a single grain. And we are fighting for life."
"Grandpa, I can't let you."
uN ow you leave it to us. We'll build it on the quiet .."
"But how can you hide what you're doing?"
"Come, come," grinned Grandpa. "Don't ask a craftsman
to give away his secrets."
"Well," said the colonel, sitting down again. "I'm acting
against my better judgment. How long will it take you?"
"Thirteen days."
"Beter make it three weeks."
"Thirteen days," insisted Grandpa. "The number thirteen
is sacred in Lyubino Polye. We drive thirteen nails into each
coffin lid. And the timber has to be treated for thirteen weeks ,
before it can be used for ikons."
:I(:

:1(:

'
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Next day five old men in white newly-washed homespun
tunics set out along the road which led to the advanced group
of Soviet forces, the vanguard that had wedged deep into the
German lines. There was not a soul in sight. Only the wrecked
trucks by the wayside belied the stillness.
To the left of the road there was a sniper-infested copse.
To the left, also, the swamp was visible, an unhealthy bright
green, with a bush here and there. The old men moved along
a river-bank skirting the swamp. After about a mile they
branched off, and four of them kneeled down and inspected
the grass. Then they reported the result of their inspection
to the fifth, Grandpa Kondratenkov, the oldest and most
experienced of the party.
He was so ancien! that he had forgotten .h is own age, nor
was there anyone in the village who could enlighten him,
for the oldest person remembered him first as a full-grown
man with a tinge of gray in his beard.
I
"A likely spot," Makar Savelyich suggested.
"Mark it out, Makarushka," said Grandpa. "Mitrofanych,
you hurry back to the village: Tell the men to say goodbye
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to their womenfolk. Tell 'em they're going to live a military
life from now on."
Four old men moved across the bright swamp toward the
forest. In the forest they pulled their belts tighter and, hatchets
in hand, strode off through the thickets to mark off trees,
those that were straightest, and with the cleanest trunks.
"Don't take 'em too close together, boys," Grandpa warned.
"Or the Germans in those tree-tops will notice the gaps."
By noon, the other old men of the village had reached the
spot, and work proceeded apace.
After marking the necessary number of trees, the old men
removed their padded jackets and lay down for a nap until
the protective darkness fell. Then, when the moon appeared
from behind the clouds, there was a dull tapping in the
swampy wood by the river, as though huge woodpeckers with
metal bills were pecking away at the trees.
Each tree was felled with three strokes: the first was an
oblique one, and tore off a long strip of bark, as though
preparing the tree for pain and death. The second stroke
penetrated the tree to the very core. The third, dealt with
the butt-end of the axe, severed the tree from its life-giving
roots. The tree toppled to the ground, its leaves swishing sorrowfully through the branches of its neighbors.
Each tree was trimmed of its lower branches. Then the
old men lashed the logs together in rafts .

•
A week later the colonel sent his aide to see how the work
was progressing, and to ask if the old men needed any help.
But all he could get out of them were barely perceptible sly
smile~. "Do you know what goes on top of the sub-flooring?"
they asked. The aide looked blank. So they dismissed him
politely. "Well, you really can't help us much, in that case."
"What goes on top of the sub-flooring!" shouted the colonel.,
when informed what they had said. "Why, man, the floor,
of course! Oh, well, if they feel like joking, I suppose I
needn't worry. Things must be getting along all right."
"Perhaps they are, perhaps they aren't," said the aide,
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rather stiffly. "All I can say is I've never seen anyone build
a road like that before."
N ext day the colonel himself rode down to the site. It was
nothing like any road-building job he had ever seen. The
swamp showed no mark of pickaxe or spade. Indeed, what
could axe or spade have done in that spongy morass?
He began to wonder whether he had come to the right
spot. Yes, it must be right. There, out of the forest, appeared the stately figure of Makar Savelyich, walking toward
him across the swamp. The colonel had an impulse to give a
warning shout, but checked himself when he saw how confidently the old man moved over the treacherous surface.
Makar Savelyich was as lean as a wolf in early spring, and
the colonel asked him anxiously: "Are you getting anything to
eat out here?"
"Two meals a day, and good hot food, too. What brings
you along ahead of time, Colonel?"
"Why, I just wanted to see if there was anything you
wanted," the colonel answered, afraid of offending the old
man, "and to have a look around."
"You won't see anything here. The road is being laid
through the forest. Look-there goes part of it now."
Eight old men had come out of the forest, carrying a wooden
raft suspended on ropes. They looked rather like pallbearers
with a hearse. They lowered the raft to the ground, and were
followed by eight more old men with a similar contraption.
The rafts were laid end to end. Then two of the men began
to lash them together with some kind of cloth.
"Why, Makar Savelyich, they'll be sucked in by the swamp,"
the colonel said, distressed. "There are quagmires here you'd
never get out of alive.'~
"Aye, aye, boy, so there are. Only not where we're laying
the road. Just turn round and take a look over there, over
the top of the grass, where it's longest. What can you see?"
"Grass, .only green grass," the colonel replied, staring at the
gently tossing surface.
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"Have another look. Is it all green, or can you see a bit
of yellow, as well?"
The colonel strained his eyes until he saw, or thought he
saw, a sort of thin, yellowish stripe treadding the lush greenery.
"Yes, I see," he said.
"Well, that yellow tells you it's "not real swamp. The tips
of the grass are scorched by the sun. That means they get
less moisture. Now real swamp grass is never like that. In
a real swamp the sun never scorches the grass, no matter how
hot it is, because the roots are resting in water below the
surface. But here the roots are in firm ground, and there's
less moisture. At first glance it looks like real swamp grass.
But actually the soil is only damp near the surface, where the
rain wets it. U:nderneath, its quite hard and dry. You can
rest supports on it. Let's have a look at the planks."
They moved toward the forest. In spite of the old man's
reassurances, the colonel stepped along very gingerly, the
ground beneath him swaying and bobbing as he moved.
Five or six rafts were lying on the ground, and the colonel
noticed that the road they formed had began to curve, following the direction of the yellow-tipped grass.
The.Iogs were nailed together on a cross-beam, and the finished rafts were laid on thick, "transverse logs which held them
clear of the ground. Makar Savelyich singled out a blade of
grass with a dark brown tip from its hiding place between
two sorry shoots of wild pea. Then he probed about in the
soil for its root, and pulled it up. The root looked like a
long, white worm. It was dry, and forked at the end. He
held the root against one of the transverse logs. The thickness
of the log and the lengtp of the root were the same.
"Now, do you see? With these for sleepers, the road's as
firm as a rock."
"I understand," replied the colonel respectfully.
"Aye, that's it," said the old man proudly. "Ev~rything
in nature's topsy-turvy with' us."
"Take cover!" A ringing boyish voice broke the silence.
The shout came from above, as if from a tree.
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"My little grandson," explained the old man. "He's our
spotter/' A pulsating roar burst on them from over the forest, and a Henschel dived low over the trees, almost grazing
their crests. Then it soared above the swamp.
The old men had already thrown a net of green grass over
the rafts. The bomb fell about 300 yards from where they
stood. A green fountain of grass and water, shaped like a
poplar, spurted up and fell in a shower of spray.
"Restless devil, that one," observed Makar Savelyich.
"Comes over every day. He seems to smell the rat, but he
doesn't know quite where it is."
The plane dropped another bomb and vanished behind the
trees. Over the forest it released a third. A tree toppled
over, splintered by the blast. A confused noise of shouts and
curses followed. One of the old men ran out of the forest
with a birch-bark pail, and hurried down to the river.
"What's happened, Danilych?"
The colonel and Makar Savelyich rushed into the forest.
Near the stri(;;ken tree lay Grandpa Kondratenkov, his face
dark and dour. His friends stood around him in a circle.
"Almost knocked the wind out of me," Grandpa gasped.
"I feel quite empty inside, and as light as a feather."
"Eat a bit of the soil, and you'll feel heavier," Makar Savelyich advised him.
They turned Grandpa over on his stomach. He pressed his
~outh to the dark moist ground, churned up by the explo~
Slon.
"No good, boys," he groaned. "Makarushka, I didn't fasten
the rope at the fifth lap. See you don't forget it. Keep a bit
more to the right of the stream, when you get deeper into the
forest. The ground's firmer.
"Don't you worry about that, Grandpa," soothed lVlakar
. Savelyich.
"I know, I know, Makarushka," sighed the ancient. "But
folk are so young, so spoiled. . . ." His voice was barely a
whisper. Then he suddenly sat up. "I can't die with everything in such a mess. Give me some water."
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They gave him some cold water from the stream. After
swallowing some of it with difficulty, noisily, he got up. He
swayed. Then, leaning forward slightly, he steadied himself
on his wide-spread bandy legs, planted so firmly on the
ground that he looked as if he had taken root in it.
"Hand over that brace, Danilych," he said, breathing heavily.
On the thirteenth day, when the sun was well up in the
sky, the chairman of the village Soviet appeared at the colonel's dugout and reported, military fashion, that the job
was done. That even~ng there was a meeting, at which the
colonel expressed the gratitude of the Red Army units which,
thanks to the labors of Lyubino Polye, were able to launch
an offensive against the enemy.
Next morning the first column of loaded trucks drove over
the new road. The planks sighed heavily and sank to the
level of the ground, squeezing moisture between the edges,
and then settled down firmly, for all time.
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NOTE
These are examples of the big and little things that went
on for forty-seven months in the rear of the Wehrmacht and
in the rear of the Red Army. These big and litle things done
by the people of the Soviet Union made it possible for the
Soviet Army, Navy and Air Force to do the seemingly impossible. From Generalissimo Stalin who inspired, directed
and sustained the titanic effort, down to the last woodsman
and partisan-the Soviet people dearly bought Russia's share
in our partnership of triumph. This brief and inadequate
account is written lest that share and its price be forgotten
and the Russian achievement obscured by the dazzling explosions of atomic bombs which~ let us remember~ occurred when
the war had already been won and which~ furthermore~ will
never be able to take the place of the effort of valiant peoples
in their righteous struggle for freedom.
SERGEI KOURNA'KOFF
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